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U.S. economic engagement toward Cuba facilitates a relationship based on binary that locks Cuba into a place of opposition. These policies do not occur in a vacuum, rather they are a result of a socio-cultural relationship to otherness that attempts to gain order and control through the limitation of affective encounters

McNeil ’10(Calum McNeil – PhD candidate in International Relations at McMaster University, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 1, “To engage or not to engage: An (a)ffective argument in favour of a policy of engagement with Cuba” [SG])

The purpose here is not simply to illustrate positive or negative functionality, however, but to stress the degree to which emotional commitments are implicated in American and Canadian foreign policy toward Cuba—and how this process fails to acknowledge, but is a product of, the way power, emotion and context shape subjectivity in differing contexts. A basic premise of the hot cognition approach is that all political stimuli are affectively charged. This means that perception, interpretation and reaction are both cognitive and affective; thought devoid of emotional content is also devoid of meaning—it is an abstraction and consequently cannot compel us to act consistently in one way or another. It is not surprising, then, that certain emotionally laden normative commitments would inform both Canadian and American foreign policy. It is also not surprising they would not be acknowledged as reflective of a pervasive ideology, but rather as the natural order of things—so natural that they become subconscious and unquestioned, and are deployed in ways which uncritically presuppose their universality. The geopolitical context has changed radically since 1989. The collapse of Soviet communism opened up policymaking possibilities while creating new problems, some unforeseen. For Cuba, the end of the Cold War was an unmitigated disaster. Protected by its strategic and economic relationship with the Soviet Union from the full effect of the US economic embargo since the 1960s, Cuban policymakers suddenly found themselves exposed to the unfiltered force of US hostility. With its economy imploding, Cuba sought alternative sources for economic and political support. Domestically, Cuba instituted the Special Period in Time of Peace, and began to alter the structure of its economy to correspond to new realities. The key impetus in Cuban foreign policy became strategic diversification, wherein Cuban policymakers sought to maximize their decision-making options by avoiding over-dependence on a single bilateral relationship with a more powerful state (Erisman, & Kirk, 1991: 2-4; Entwistle, 2009: 292-293). It was partly in relation to this changed context that both American and Canadian policies toward Cuba during the 1990s were reformulated. Canadian policy has traditionally treated Cuba like any other state in Latin America. What makes the policy interesting is the consistency with which it has been adhered to, given the American hostility to the Castro-led government. During the 1990s, the Chrétien liberals sought to re-engage with Cuba just as American policy veered toward strengthening its embargo. In this context, empathetic dialogue and a renewed Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) presence, combined with public and private criticism of Cuban human rights violations, were understood as politically and symbolically advantageous (Sagebien, 1997: 67). The essence of the approach was balance. As Robert Wright (2009: 197) argues: “[Chrétien] … calculated that a pragmatic re-engagement with Cuba along lines similar to Pierre Trudeau’s policy would carry limited political liability if it was paired with a strong, explicit Canadian objection to Cuban human rights abuses.” In this way Canadian officials believed that Canada could demonstrate its autonomy internationally, while influencing Cuba to liberalize its economy and democratize its political system (Wylie, 2009: 16). This dovetailed nicely with Cuba’s desire to diversify its foreign relationships, and the necessity Havana faced in replacing lost Soviet/Come con trade and investment. Canadian policy toward Cuba since the Revolution has functioned as a means of asserting Canadian autonomy vis-à-vis the United States (Molinaro, 2009; Entwistle, 2009). From the Canadian perspective, relations with Cuba necessarily and unavoidably reflect the policy decisions undertaken in Washington. Yet the nature of Canadian policy is also idiosyncratic in that it reflects the domestic culture and context within which policymaking takes place. This concern is evident from a reading of the parliamentary debates regarding the question of Cuba throughout the 1990s. As Christine Stewart, the then Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) noted in response to the proposed Helms-Burton legislation that was making its way through Congress: We hope there will be amendments to this legislation before it is pursued in the United States. However, we have made it very clear that Canada will be pursuing and will continue to pursue an independent foreign policy. This is very well respected world-wide. (Canada, 1995a. Italics added for emphasis). The emphasis on policy autonomy is marked, as well as the assumption of its importance To Canada’s image abroad. What it reveals is a parochial tendency to conflate an inflated fear of infringement upon Canadian autonomy, with a parochial understanding of Canadian values and their universal applicability—generally in juxtaposition with the United States. Here we see a tendency to assume that others see Canada as Canada would like to see itself. It is interesting in this regard to consider Christine Stewart’s conflation of self-interest with an ostensibly altruistic foreign policy to Latin America. She argues: I believe that Canada should continue to support regional initiatives in favour of human rights, environmental protection and trade development… in this process, we should also make sure that poor countries are not marginalized. Marginalization of less developed countries can result in instability and massive movements of populations away from poor countries and into rich ones, and could also jeopardize emerging economies. Such situations have repercussions all over the world … Cuba poses another challenge. The Cuban economy has undergone serious deterioration. Economic reforms have been limited as have human rights improvements. However I believe we cannot afford to marginalize any country in this hemisphere. Careful evaluation is necessary to encourage the full reintegration of Cuba into the hemispheric family, a process that will require significant change (Canada, 1995b. Italics added for emphasis). The perceived threat noted in failing to engage the developing world—of which Cuba is a part—is combined with an assumption concerning the terms of reintegration, terms which require careful evaluation by Canada if full reintegration is to be achieved. The objectification of Cuba, and the privileging of the Canadian subject position are quite stark in this example; the terms of reintegration are to be determined by careful Canadian evaluation as a means—ironically—of circumventing their marginalization. That this hassled to a position of some hypocrisy is highlighted by Peter McKenna and John Kirk when they note that: … Cuban authorities also know that the Canadian government does not do Washington’s bidding and that it does not intend to do anything to destabilize the Castro regime or to punish the Cuban people; instead, it aims to work constructively by dialoguing with the Cubans (2005: 159). There is a logic in the fear Ottawa has of destabilizing the Cuban government, insofar as it might also destabilize the region; a dialogue-based incremental approach would seem to have the advantage of mitigating this outcome—yet this logic still fails to acknowledge how unreceptive Cuban policy makers are to encroachments into their domestic politics, regardless of the form they take (Klepak, 2009: 33-34; Entwistle, 2009: 292). Given the implicit commitment to regime change inherent in the constructive engagement policy, it is difficult to see how Canadian policy can be understood as not having the effect of destabilizing the Cuban government; what has been characteristic of Canadian constructive engagement is not dialogue but monologue—a policy characterized by an implicit and uncritical assumption that the terms of the discussion should be shaped by the normative commitments underpinning the constructive component of the engagement policy. This dynamic is perhaps nowhere better evidenced than in the Chrétien visit to Cuba in April 1998. The high profile visit came in the wake of the 1997 fourteen-point Joint Declaration, fostering state-to-state cooperation in areas including human rights and standards of good governance (Wylie 2009: 48). The Declaration seemed to validate the constructive engagement approach of the Chrétien Liberals insofar as it included measures aimed at strengthening bilateral ties—including a willingness to discuss human rights. The visit itself was therefore undertaken as a high profile and symbolic means to demonstrate the efficacy of engaging in this way with Cuba so as to secure both economic and political/human rights gains. It would also serve as a means to position Canada in relation to Cuba “on the right side of history” (Wright 2009: 217). The decisive moment of the visit occurred when Chrétien publicly humiliated Castro by confronting him with a demand to release four jailed Cuban dissidents (Wright 2009: 210). Humiliated and shocked though he may have been, the move failed in its desired effect and the dissidents were not released. The visit, argues Mark Entwistle, accomplished “practically nothing” (2009: 289). In the fall of 1999, then International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew still maintained that constructively engaging could achieve the ends sought(and assumed inevitable) by Canadian policymakers. He argued, “The best way to help [Cuba] to [implement reforms] … is to engage them and integrate them into world markets” (quoted in Kirk & McKenna, 2005: 155). What this also seems to indicate is that the perception of policymakers in Ottawa is affectively shaped by the context in which they are situated. Regardless of their dispositions, a key attribute of all policy makers is loyalty to the state—that is, a performed (emotional) commitment to serving the national interest. This necessarily inclines policy to be informed in the first instance by the perceived material interests of the state (i.e., preserving autonomy, and securing new markets for Canadian business), and in a broader sense by the perceived values and their associated norms which define Canadian-ness at home, and it is assumed, abroad. Lana Wylie (2004: 42) argues that “… the Canadian self-image as a good international citizen, peacekeeper, and as distinct from the United States, all contribute to a certain perception of the Cuban situation, and the Canadian-Cuban relationship, and consequently to a corresponding set of norms.” Although these norms help us to explain some of the character of the relationship, they do little to explain how these ideas become entrenched and gain legitimacy and how they possibly morph overtime. What they also point to, when taken in conjunction with an understanding of the relationship between emotion, reason, and socio-cultural context, is that a culturally informed normative parochialism is perhaps a pre-condition of the necessary affective dynamics inherent in the relationship between individuals and the state. That this dynamic has been self-defeating in the Cuban context requires a consideration of how power, emotion and culture can act in the Cuban context to preclude the inevitability of regime change. Before we can consider this, it is important to consider the above dynamics from the American perspective. The two most contentious pieces of legislation pertaining to Cuba are embodied in the 1992CDA and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. The CDA, in some ways, reflects the systemic and domestic contexts of the early 1990s. With the Cold War over and the Soviet bloc transitioning to market-based economies and representative democratic political systems, it was assumed that Cuba—deprived of Soviet subsidies and hopelessly isolated—would eventually follow suit. As the CDA notes: The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of government and development, and the evident inability of Cuba's economy to survive current trends, provide the United States and the international democratic community with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba (CDA, 1992: §6001(6)). Thus, it seemed the revolutionary Cuban government would be unable to withstand the tide of history, and would eventually be swept aside in the inevitable march toward a relatively uniform global political economy broadly consistent with the norms prevalent in Western capitalist democracies. Domestically, the key factors engendering an inclination toward adopting the CDA were the influences of the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) and the political manoeuvring of both candidates vying for the 1992 US presidential election. The Act itself attempts to strengthen the economic pressures brought to bear on the Cuban state (known as Track I), with attempts to increase bilateral relationships at the non-governmental level (known as Track II). The Track I CDA legislation affected Canada and other states trading with Cuba by preventing subsidiaries of American corporations from trading with Cuba, and by preventing foreign ships docking in Cuban ports from unloading or loading cargo in US ports for six months (CDA, 1992: Sec. 6005). This extra-territorial component to the CDA angered US trading partners by challenging the primacy of both domestic law and policy autonomy in those countries (Morley \*& McGillion, 2002: 45). The Track I components of the Act were meant to hasten the demise of the current government and to bring about a quick transition to the US government’s preferred form of political system for the island. The CDA is quite clear in this regard stating that the President may waive the sanctions and take steps toward ending the embargo if he determines that the Cuban state has met the standards for democratic transition set forth in the Act. Amongst these include the holding of “free and fair elections under internationally recognized observers[and movement]toward establishing a free market economic system” (CDA, 1992: § 6006). Track II diplomacy, by way of contrast, involves the “unofficial interactions between people from countries or groups in conflict for the purpose of promoting peaceful solutions to international disagreements” (Blight & Brenner, 2002: 170). Although the CDA’s provisions for increased interpersonal interaction between Americans and Cubans are framed in humanitarian terms, these Track II provisions also embody a belief in the potential for people-to-people contacts to develop a Cuban civil society capable of challenging and ultimately overturning the Cuban government (CDA, 1992: § 6004g). William LeoGrande (2005: 37) points to this element of the CDA when he argues “from the outset, Washington conceived of these contacts as a way to subvert the Cuban government. That was how the policy was promoted when first introduced by Congressman Robert Torricelli, author of the CDA”. It is the transparent political intent of this legislation that makes it ultimately self-defeating. The Cuban government was well aware of the purpose of Track II—and cracked down on dissidents accordingly. More interesting still, LeoGrande points to one unanticipated outcome of President Clinton’s decision to allow travel to Cuba for religious, humanitarian and people-to-people contacts: the emergence of a constituency in the United States advocating a change in the hard-line US policy (2005: 27). It is the uncritical presumption that the Cuban government would not recognize the threat constituted by the CDA’s Track II provisions and that these interactions would necessarily hasten the demise of the Cuban government that are so problematic and self-defeating Helms-Burton represented a further tightening of the economic noose—this time with a more explicit commitment to the character and content of a future non-Castro Cuba. This particular piece of legislation was passed into law four years after the CDA, and strengthens the extra-territorial implications of the CDA so as to increase the risks involved for foreign corporations that seek to conduct business with Cuba and the United States. In particular, Title III of the Act provides a means through which American citizens can sue investors in property found to be expropriated by the Cuban government after the Revolution, and Title IV of the Act allows Washington to ban business people and their families from entering the United States if they are found to be trafficking in expropriated property (Helms-Burton Act 1996:Title III, § 302;Title IV, § 401). In addition, Helms-Burton specifically excludes either of the Castro brothers from any role in the transition process or a future non-revolutionary government, and provides the President with the right to determine whether or not a transition is actually taking place (Helms-Burton 1996: Title II, § 205-207). Although Title III was, and has continued to be, suspended every six months, it is still in effect—as is Title IV. Both Title III and IV outraged Canadian, Mexican and European policymakers as blatant attempts to impose US law extra-territorially. Robert G. Wright, then Canadian Deputy Minister for International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stated the Canadian position in regard to Helms-Burton succinctly: The Interamerican Juridical Committee … found the legislation to be inconsistent with international law in a number of different respects. Key among these were the following: First, domestic courts are not the appropriate forum for resolution of state-to-state claims; second, the committee found that a claimant state, in this instance the United States, does not have the right to espouse claims of persons who were not their nationals at the time of the taking; and third, the committee found that the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over acts of trafficking by aliens abroad under circumstances whereby neither the alien nor the conduct in question has any connection with its territory is not in conformity with international law (Canada, 1996). However, the Deputy Minister continues that: … Canada and the United States share common objectives with respect to Cuba. Both countries would like to see steps taken toward democracy, economic reform, and a greater recognition of human rights. We differ in the approach. The United States has adopted a policy of isolation; Canada, on the other hand, believes in a policy of engagement (Canada, 1996). The thrust of the Canadian position is that Helms-Burton violates Canadian autonomy, and is in this specific way against Canada’s national interest. The need for Canada to be perceived as distinct from the United States is also evident in above quotations; a display of Canadian autonomy has been a primary impetus to Canadian Cuba policy since the Revolution (Wylie, 2009: 62). Moreover, the Canadian position in relation to Cuba differs from the United States primarily as a preference of process to the same end: democracy and market-oriented economic reform. It is interesting that, even as the Canadian position demands respect for its own sovereignty, it also advocates a foreign policy toward Cuba predicated upon interference in that state’s domestic affairs. The passage of the Act was far from smooth, as the US public, exporters and many policymakers were also concerned with what seemed extreme and potentially self-defeating legislation (Gott, 2004: 303-307). It is indeed unlikely that Helms-Burton would ever have been enacted into law had it not been for the shooting down of two aircraft operated by the anti-Castro group, Brothers to the Rescue. As Lana Wylie (2004: 46) stresses: Prior to the shooting down, the only pressure to sign Helms-Burton was coming from the Cuban-American community. Despite their electoral clout, Clinton had opposed the bill. However, like their policymakers, the American public reacted viscerally to the shoot-down. Emotions were running high and Clinton’s advisors felt they had no choice but to get behind the legislation. This response seems understandable, until one considers the situation from the Cuban perspective. Jose Basulto, the founder of the Brothers to the Rescue, was initially a CIA trained operative as a part of Operation Mongoose during the 1960s (Blight and Brenner, 2002: 165). In August of 1962, Basulto had been involved in a botched attempt on Castro’s life and in the 1980s worked again for the CIA in Nicaragua. Brothers to the Rescue was founded as a means to facilitate the rescue of Cubans seeking to leave Cuba during the Special Period. Yet this humanitarian initiative became increasingly politicized as Clinton moved closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. As a result, Basulto began dropping leaflets regularly over Havana to encourage the Cubans to rise up against their government (Blight & Brenner, 2002: 167).Given this history, and despite repeated protests to the United States government by Cuba, nothing was done to stop this provocation. Although it is unclear whether the aircrafts were over Cuban airspace when they were shot down, the Cuban reaction, although severe, was at least somewhat more understandable, given the broader context. The affective quality of the response to the shoot-down fits snugly within the broader assumptions about the character of the Cuban state, and Castro in particular, as framed by his detractors. The embargo itself facilitated the entrenchment of a particular vision of Cuba to the American public by limiting their contact with the island, and magnifying their reliance upon highly politicized groups, like the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), and right wing neoconservative politicians, like Jesse Helms, for information. This lack of empathy was still in evidence after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Even when the Cuban state denounced terrorism and expressed sympathy toward the United States after the attacks, the United States government did not respond in kind. Instead the Bush administration increased its rhetoric against the Cuban government and continued to label it a terrorist-supporting nation (LeoGrande, 2005: 32). What the above analysis points to is the degree to which emotion and context have shaped the rather problematic relations between Canada, the United States and Cuba. If, however, we find problematic the notion that the current political system in Cuba has little legitimacy domestically, and no hope for survival in the medium term, we must address the question of why this is so. Robert Damasio argues that for the somatic marking process to function, a capacity to order criteria relevant to the stimuli encountered by the subject is required. This ordering criterion is determined via a combination of emotion, working memory and attention, which are reflective of biological drives and cultural socialization. In a sense, every decision we make is influenced by a combination of logic (one would hope) and affectively charged analogical reasoning. Worded concisely, somatic markers act as a kind of heuristic psychological culling device functionally integrated into our decision-making process; its use facilitates more efficient decision-making in cognitively complex scenarios by a priori eliminating the appeal of certain courses of action. The process of somatic marking outlined here, therefore, seems particularly apt to a foreign policy-making context. This is so, given the cognitive complexity of foreign policy decision-making, wherein policy-makers must contend with not only the likely actions and outcomes beyond the state in the relevant issue area, but also the domestic, bureaucratic, and even dispositional constraints placed on the array of choices available to them. Negative somatic markers juxtaposed alongside specific future outcomes—say the elimination of an embargo—can alert the individual against that particular course of action; conversely, positive somatic markers can act as a “beacon of incentive” influencing the subjects’ decision-making toward that particular outcome (Damasio, 1994: 174-175). This process of somatic marking functions both consciously and subconsciously, influencing those elements in the brain which incline us to approach behaviour, and mitigating the likelihood of making what we are culturally inclined to believe is a wrong decision (Damasio, 1994: 188). We have already seen the doggedness with which Canadian policy makers have clung to the belief that constructive engagement can result in political and economic change in Cuba, despite much evidence to the contrary. Similarly, the tone and tenor of US relations with Cuba have been characterized by a profound lack of empathy—a characteristic which, when combined with the tremendous material power of the American state, could aptly be termed pathological parochialism. Canada has at least adopted an approach which goes further in acknowledging the legitimacy of the Cuban government—yet even its policies how a self-defeating desire to combine an ardent commitment to pursuing the national interest (with a marked affective commitment to policy autonomy relative to its southern neighbour) with a normative commitment to engendering the re-construction of the Cuban political economy in ways which correspond more closely to its own. Given that both states have expressed a commitment 11 in principle (if not always in practise) to regime change, and given that this change is uncritically expected to result in a Cuban political system mirroring the basic principles that their own systems embrace, it seems logical for both state’s policies to be geared toward achieving this end as effectively as possible. Yet neither embargo nor constructive engagement seems capable of achieving the end of transforming the Cuban political system. It is my contention that, in the case of American and Canadian relations with Cuba, the state is singularly ill equipped to foster the kind of empathy required to bring about the ends it seeks. It may be that the most effective means to win the battle for hearts and minds in Cuba—if indeed such a battle can be won—is to extricate the state from the interactive process. If it is true that liberal democratic capitalism, to paraphrase Fukuyama, is the “only game in town”, then allowing Canadians and Americans—and their attendant dispositions—to engage Cubans in unstructured (and therefore relatively de-politicized) ways should have the desired and inevitable effect. Of course, an underlying premise of this paper is that neuroscience and neuropsychology has rendered problematic any universal assumptions about rationality. In particular, Robert Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis indicates that the relationship between emotion, reason, and the process of social learning, facilitated by interpersonal interaction, problematizes universal rationality assumptions. As a consequence we cannot a priori assume the outcome of an engagement policy between Canada or the United States and Cuba. As Damasio (1994: 200) argues: The automated somatic-marker device of most of us lucky enough to have been reared in a relatively healthy culture has been accommodated by education to the standards of rationality of that culture. In spite of its roots in biological regulation, the device has been tuned to cultural prescriptions designed to ensure survival in a particular society … [the device] has been made rational relative to social conventions and ethics. Thus an inadvertent effect of the US embargo has been to forestall the sharing of lived experiences between Americans and Cubans; the embargo has skewed the acquisition of somatic marking, and both magnified the degree to which Cuban policy elites fear and mistrust US initiatives toward their country, and facilitated the ability of both states to frame the significant other in a negative fashion for public consumption.

This understanding of Cuba reduces it to an object of American desire. The affective depiction of Cuba as an indispensable tool for American interests has create a relationship defined by domination

Pérez 8 (Louis A., Ph.D. University of New Mexico, Professor of History at University of North Carolina, "Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos,")

Cuba came to the attention of the world at large principally by way of figurative depiction, more precisely, in the form of metaphors imbued with colonial meanings: in the sixteenth century as "the Key of the New World" ("la Llave del Nuevo Mundo"), "the Key to the Gulf" ("la Llave del Golfo"), and "the Bulwark of the West Indies" ("el Antemural de las Indias Occidentales"); in the nineteenth century as "the Queen of the Antilles," "the Pearl of the Antilles," "the Gem of the Antilles," and "the richest jewel in the royal crown," by which time, too, it had earned the designation of "the Ever Faithful Isle" ("la Siempre Fidelisima Isla"). Metaphorical representation also developed into the principal mode by which the Americans propounded the possession of Cuba as a matter indispensable to the future well-being of the United States. To advance a plausible claim to a territory governed by Spain, and to which its inhabitants presumed rightful succession to rule, required the Americans to create a parallel reality by which they persuaded themselves-and sought to persuade others-that Cuba rightfully belonged to them, not only, however, and indeed not even principally, as a matter of self-interest but as a function of providential purpose and moral propriety. Metaphorical constructs were central to the process by which national interest was enacted as idealized purpose: at once a combination of denial and dissimulation, a source of entitlement, and a means of empowerment. To understand the North American use of metaphor is to gain insight into the use of cultural models and social relationships in which the U.S. imperial project was conditioned. Metaphors of Cuba served to advance U.S. interests and were, in turn, mediated by racial attitudes and gender hierarchies, on one hand, and prescience of destiny, on the other. They worked best within those belief systems from which Americans obtained their cues concerning matters of civic duty and moral conduct and, indeed, were the principal means by which intent of purpose and reception of meaning were transacted. Figurative depiction drew into complicity all who shared a common cultural system from which collectively to receive the meaning desired of metaphor, what Herbert Clark and Catherine Marshall described as "mutual knowledge based on com- munity membership?"

This hierarchical understanding does not stop at the state level. Through this system of control, the state is able to coopt the material economy of affect and create a metanarrative of Cuba to which we must all prescribe to. This forces an understanding of difference that is necessarily outside and must be vanquished

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Affect is, for Deleuze and Spinoza, an index of power: we may feel pain (a sad passion) when our power of acting diminishes; we may feel exultation (a joyful passion) when it is enhanced. In turn, a body’s power is itself is a function of its affective capacity or receptivity, its power to move or be moved by others. And as its power changes, so does its very essence: increases or decreases in a body’s power, changes in its affection, determine its ability to further affect and be affected, to become another body (more or less powerful). Affect marks the passage whereby one body becomes another body, either joyfully or sorrowfully; affect always takes place between bodies, at the mobile threshold between affective states as bodies either coalesce or disintegrate, as they become other to themselves. Hence, Massumi argues, affect constitutes an immanent and unbounded “field of emergence” or “pure capacity” prior to the imposition of order or subjectivity. It is another name for the continuous variation that characterizes the infinite encounters between bodies, and their resultant displacements and transformations, constitutions and dissolutions. It is only as affect is delimited and captured that bodies are fixed and so subjectivity (or at least, individual subjectivity) and transcendence emerge. But as this happens, affect itself changes: the order that establishes both subjectivity and transcendence also (and reciprocally) converts affect into emotion. The myriad encounters between bodies in flux come to be represented as interactions between fixed individuals or subjects, and affect becomes qualified and confined within (rather than between) particular bodies. This qualification of affective intensity is also its “capture and closure”; Massumi suggests that “emotion is the most intense (most contracted) expression of that capture.” As affect is transformed into emotion, it founds sovereignty. Deleuze and his co-author, the psychoanalyst and activist Félix Guattari, provide an example taken from the stage to illustrate the capture and so subjection of affect. In opera, the “romantic hero,” that is, “a subjectified individual with ‘feelings,’” emerges from (and retrospectively orders and envelops) “the orchestral and instrumental whole that on the contrary mobilizes nonsubjective ‘affects.’” But this orchestration of affect, its transformation into emotion, is also immediately political: the “problem” of affect in opera is “technically musical, and all the more political for that.” The same mechanisms orchestrate subjectivity in politics as in the opera house. Massumi focuses on the ways in which contemporary regimes exploit “affect as capturable life potential.” He details how Ronald Reagan, for instance, put affect to work in the service of state power, conjuring up sovereignty by projecting confidence, “the apotheosis of affective capture.” Reagan “wants to transcend, to be someone else. He wants to be extraordinary, to be a hero.” But ideology had nothing to do with this arch-populist’s transcendence: “His means were affective.” Rather than seeking consent, Reagan achieved the semblance of control by transmitting “vitality, virtuality, tendency.” Affect, then, is more than simply an index of the immanent, corporeal power of bodies whose definition mutates according to their state of affection; it is also what underpins the incorporeal or “quasi-corporeal” power of the sovereign whose empirical body, in Reagan’s case, crumbles before our eyes. In this double role, as an immanent productivity that gives rise to transcendent power, affect is “as infrastructural as a factory.” Like labor power, it is a potential that can be abstracted and put to use, a “liveliness” that “may be apportioned to objects as properties or attributes,” an “excess” or “surplus” that “holds the world together.” Just as Latin America has long supplied raw material to feed the global economy, so the region has also been exploited for its affective potential. Gold, silver, copper, guano, rubber, chocolate, sugar, tobacco, coffee, coca: these have all sustained peripheral monocultures whose product has been refined and consumed in the metropolis. And parallel to and intertwined with this consumer goods economy is a no less material affective economy, also often structured by a distinction between the raw and the refined. After all, several of these substances are mood enhancers, confected into forms (rum, cigarettes, cocaine) that further distill their affective powers. Others have inspired their own deliria: gold fever, rubber booms. But there has always been a more direct appropriation and accumulation of affective energy: from the circulation of fearful travelers’ tales describing cannibals and savages, to the dissemination of “magic realism” and salsa, or the commodification of sexuality for Hollywood or package tourism. Latin America marks the Western imagination with a particular intensity. And the figures who stand in for the region are therefore distinguished by their affective charge: the “Brazilian bombshell” Carmen Miranda, for instance, her headdresses loaded with fruit signifying tropical bounty, served in films such as Week-End in Havana (1941) and The Gang’s All Here (1943) as a fetishized conduit for the exuberance and sexiness that Hollywood captures, distils, and purveys as “Latin spirit.” At the same time, and despite the elaborate orchestration typifying a Carmen Miranda number, some disturbing excess remained, not least in the ways in which Miranda’s patter upset linguistic convention. She blurred English and Portuguese and dissolved both, (re)converting language into sounds that were no longer meaningful, only affectively resonant. In film scholar Ana López’s words, “Miranda’s excessive manipulation of accents . . . inflates the fetish, cracking its surface while simultaneously aggrandizing it.” So there is a complex relationship between Latin affect and Western reason: both reinforcement and subversion. Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz suggests that at stake in the exploitation of Latin affect is a colonial pact with the devil: he says of tobacco and chocolate from the Americas, as well as Arabian coffee and tea from the Far East (“all of them stimulants of the senses as well as of the spirit”) that “it is as though they had been sent to Europe from the four corners of the earth by the devil to revive Europe ‘when the time came,’ when that continent was ready to save the spirituality of reason from burning itself out and give the senses their due once more.” An economy of the senses saves reason, gives it a shot in the arm, but also demonstrates reason’s addicted dependence upon sensual as well as spiritual stimulation.

**Our alternative is to reject subject-object dualism – interrogating affect is the only way to break down the state’s cooption**

Colebrook 02(Claire, Doctor of Philosophy from University of Edinburgh, English professor at Penn State University, “Gilles Deleuze” (Routledge Critical Thinkers))

One of the key ideas that runs throughout Deleuze’s work and which links his philosophy of time to an ethics is the concept of the machine. In this chapter we will look at how Deleuze moves away from humanist and organicist models in order to think a becoming and time that has no ground or foundation. This ties in with his insights on cinema, for cinema was already a ‘machinic’ becoming – a series of images freed from the human eye and located observer. Deleuze uses this concept of the machine to rethink ethics. We tend to begin our thinking from some presupposed whole: such as man, nature or an image of the universe as an interacting organism with a speciﬁc end. This allows our ethics to be reactive: we form our ethics on the basis of some pre-given unity. The machine by contrast allows for an active ethics, for we do not presuppose an intent, identity or end. Deleuze uses the machine to describe a production that is immanent: not the production of something by someone – but production for the sake of production itself, an ungrounded time and becoming. In this chapter we will look at how the radical and open nature of time can be thought of ‘machinically’ and how this allows Deleuze to form a new mode of ethics and reading. The idea of deterritorialisation, which runs through Deleuze and Guattari’s work, is directly related to the thought of the machine. Because a machine has no subjectivity or organising centre it is nothing more than the connections and productions it makes; it is what it does. It therefore has no home or ground; it is a constant process of deterritorialisation, or becoming other than itself. In Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari use a terminology of machines, assemblages, connections and productions. In Anti-Oedipus they insist that the machine is not a metaphor and that life is literally a machine. This is crucial to Deleuze’s ethics. An organism is a bounded whole with an identity and end. A mechanism is a closed machine with a speciﬁc function. A machine, however, is nothing more than its connections; it is not made by anything, is not for anything and has no closed identity. So they are using ‘machine’ here in a speciﬁc and unconventional sense. Think of a bicycle, which obviously has no ‘end’ or intention. It only works when it is connected with another ‘machine’ such as the human body; and the production of these two machines can only be achieved through connection. The human body becomes a cyclist in connecting with the machine; the cycle becomes a vehicle. But we could imagine different connections producing different machines. The cycle becomes an art object when placed in a gallery; the human body becomes an ‘artist’ when connected with a paintbrush. The images we have of closed machines, such as the self-contained organism of the human body, or the efﬁciently autonomous functioning of the clock mechanism, are effects and illusions of the machine. There is no aspect of life that is not machinic; all life only works and is insofar as it connects with some other machine. We have already seen the importance Deleuze gives to the camera; it is important as a machine because it shows how human thought and life can become and transform through what is inhuman. By insisting that the machine is not a metaphor Deleuze and Guattari move away from a representational model of language. If the concept of machine were a metaphor, then we could say that we have life as it is, and then the ﬁgure of machine to imagine, represent or picture life. But for Deleuze and Guattari there is no present life outside of its connections. We only have representations, images or thoughts because there have been ‘machinic’ connections: the eye connects with light, the brain connects with a concept, the mouth connects with a language. Life is not about one privileged point – the self-contained mind of ‘man’-representing some inert outside world. Life is a proliferation of machinic connections, with the mind or brain being one (sophisticated) machine among others.

Knowledge production is uniquely influential for IR – it’s key to policy proposals

Calkivik 10 (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” http://purl.umn.edu/99479) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

### Adv

None of their evidence says lifting the embargo leads to a new era of multilateralism – it just says lifting the embargo is a multilateral action

Plan fails and that public backlash takes out solvency

Lake 10 (Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//NG

At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact.

**Aff can’t resolve their internal links – no explanation of how we cooperate with non-democracies, whether future policymakers maintain a different mindset, and things like drone strikes in the Middle East are alt causes**

So are Guantanamo, Kyoto, ICC and CRC – 1AC Burgsdorff evidence concedes

Burgsdorff, 9(Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

**Hegemonic stability theory is nonsensical**

**Mack 10** (Andrew Mack, literally the person that they cite in their card, the guy who doesn’t like heg, “The Causes of Peace”) gz

As with other realist claims, there are reasons for **skepticism**¶ about the peace through preponderance thesis. First, if it were¶ true, we might expect that the most powerful states would¶ experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World¶ War II, **the opposite** has in fact been the case. Between 1946¶ and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the¶ greatest number of international conflicts were France, the¶ UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the¶ most powerful conventional military powers in the world—¶ and they all had nuclear weapons.¶ The fact that **major powers tend to be more involved in¶ international conflicts** than minor powers is not surprising.¶ Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project¶ substantial military power across national frontiers and often¶ over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity;¶ major powers have it by definition.¶ But there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance¶ thesis. From the end of World War II until the early 1970s,¶ nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most¶ frequent form of international conflict. The **failure** of the far¶ more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses¶ a **serious challenge** to the core assumptions of preponderance¶ theories—and marked a remarkable historical change.¶ During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule¶ there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants¶ of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one¶ analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, “by and large, it¶ would seem true that what made the machinery of European¶ troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with¶ glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.”20¶ The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing¶ military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior¶ military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the¶ previous failure of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations,¶ to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that¶ preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the¶ key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war.¶ But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities¶ raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the¶ effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular,¶ the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat¶ in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated¶ that in some types of conflict, **military preponderance could¶ neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them**.¶ The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for¶ preponderance theories.¶ Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of¶ the colonial powers **fail to deter** the nationalist rebels from¶ going to war but in every case it was **the nationalist forces¶ that prevailed**. The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies¶ gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically¶ **irrelevant**.¶ Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the¶ end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted:¶ We fought a military war; our opponents fought a¶ political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents¶ aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the¶ process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims¶ of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not¶ lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.21¶ For the nationalist forces, military engagements were¶ never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that¶ was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive¶ attrition of the metropole’s political capability to wage war—¶ “will” in the language of classical strategy.22 In such conflicts,¶ if the **human, economic, and reputational costs** to the external¶ power increase with **little prospect of victory**, support for the¶ war in the metropole will **steadily erode** and the pressure to¶ withdraw will inexorably increase.

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**No impact to heg**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

Erased from the history of hegemony is its resurgence through the neoliberal shock treatment in Chile which eliminated the people’s culture, freedom and livelihood to set up an authoritarian regime willing to reduce their country to a lab for the Chicago Boys. In the wake of the US defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent stagnation of growth, the US turned to the neoimperialism of neoliberal reforms abroad and at home to secure its future. These reforms served to roll back all protections in place which insulated the poor from the worst excesses of capitalism. Neoliberalism relies on the creation of crises, bubbles and eventually collapses; neoliberalism is predicated on imperialism, colonialism, classism and racism. We must retell the story of hegemony to include those discontinuities which are buried by the official history of liberal hegemony. The 1NC is a counter memory, a form of guerilla epistemology which reveals the river of blood that runs through all impoverished areas of the world to feed the greed and megalomania of hegemony and neoliberalism.

**Barder, 13**

/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, “American Hegemony Comes Home: The Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/

As I argued above, American liberal hegemony entered a profound crisis in the 1970s as a result of intracapitalist competition and the consequences of the American defeat in the Vietnam War. Both of these factors are missing in Ikenberry’s narrative of American international hegemony, which only focuses on certain aspects of what Arrighi calls America’s terminal crisis. What is missing in Ikenberry’s work is any sense of the reassertion of American hegemony beginning in the 1970s that culminated in the Reagan/Thatcher monetarist counterrevolution. In Ikenberry’s framework, as mentioned above, the New Deal era was internationalized in the aftermath of the Second World War as a way of mitigating the worst excesses of unregulated capitalism to promote social and economic welfare. Liberal hierarchy here works, as I argued above, unidirectionally from American embedded liberalism and its progressive instantiation in various international organizations and through the socialization of states into this American-led international order. What remains unexplored are the reverse impacts: how patterns of international hegemony create the conditions for domestic institutional change. What were the domestic consequences for the reassertion of American hegemony in the mid- to late 1970s for American domestic institutions? How, in other words, did the political–economic discourse go from the Nixonian ‘‘We are all Keynesians’’ to a decade later the famous Thatcherite mantra ‘‘There is no alternative’’ (TINA, i.e., There Is No Alternative to the radical implementation of monetarist policies and the contraction of the state)? Indeed, at a party conference in 1980, Thatcher explicitly calls for discipline and fortitude in the face of a grave economic/inflationary crisis. At the same time, she insists that her policies are to be considered ‘‘normal, sound, and honest.’’57 In other words, Thatcher promotes the inevitability and naturalness of her program at the same time as she stresses the urgency of its adoption. The depoliticized and inevitable necessity for the neoliberalization of the United States and the United Kingdom is part of what Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant have shown to be the the manifestation of a vulgate borne out ‘‘of a new type of imperialism’’. As they further add, [This vulgate’s] effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it is promoted not only by the partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under cover of ‘modernization’, intend to remake the world by sweeping away the social and economic conquests of a century of social struggles, henceforth depicted as so many archaisms and obstacles to the emergent new order, but also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing activists, the vast majority of whom still think of themselves as progressives.58 Bourdieu and Wacquant point to how the ‘‘cultural imperialism’’ of neoliberal discourse has seeped into the very vocabulary of economic governance, making it appear entirely natural and self-evident. As they observe, ‘‘the automatic effect of the international circulation of ideas, . . . tends, by its very logic, to conceal their original conditions of production and signification, the play of preliminary definitions and scholastic deductions replaces the contingency of denegated sociological necessities with the appearance of logical necessity and tends to mask the historical roots of a whole set of questions and notions . . . .’’59 Indeed, the active concealment of the origin of these neoliberal ideas and how they came into practice, I claim, points to how much neoliberal discourse forgets its origins in the crucibles of Latin American neo-imperial experiments.60 What I wish to show is how these neoliberal ideas, as part of a larger project to reassert American hegemony, were in fact initially deployed in the experimental crucibles of South America before being legitimized and normalized for implementation in the United States.61 To see then the imbrications between the reassertion of American hegemony in the 1970s and the neoliberalization of the American domestic political economy, it is important to recall that the crisis of legitimacy provoked by America’s war of attrition in Southeast Asia coincided with the emergence of novel social movements that challenged the social mores of American society. The civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the sexual revolution, and the student rebellions against the war effort revealed latent trends of racism, sexism, and other forms of social domination at the heart of American society. These movements, as Harvey notes, ‘‘challenged the traditional structure of networked class relations.’’62 Domestic emancipatory developments during the 1960s and 1970s proved to be part of, what Arrighi describes as, the ‘‘highly depressing experience for the bourgeoisie of the West’’ because it fundamentally called into question the authority of the state and the ruling classes throughout the capitalist world.63 While the 1960s represented an enormous surge in democratic participation across the developed world, in the United States especially with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Samuel Huntington would argue in 1976, such an expansion, along with an increase in governmental expenditure of social welfare, ‘‘produced a substantial . . . . decrease in governmental authority.’’64 This happened because democratic participation, for Huntington, increased ideological polarization, which in turn undermined governmental authority when the results of governmental action did not fulfill expectations. Indeed, the significant changes in fiscal, monetary, and social policies in the late 1970s were reflective of this perceived need to reassert domestic governmental authority. The Reagan administration then worked toward directly challenging the central collective compact between labor, management, and the state that the New Deal established in order to recreate a ‘‘good business environment’’ for continuous capital accumulation. 65 As David Harvey argues, unleashing financial power proved to be a convenient way to ‘‘discipline working-class movements,’’ essentially reasserting a form of class power over a society riveted by social stratification and the loss of governmental authority.66 But how was this process legitimized in the first place? Understanding what Jaime Peck terms the neoliberalization of the state necessitates a detour through Chile during the 1970s.67 The ‘‘crudely imperial’’ policies of the United States in Latin America during the 1970s proved to be a crucial feature of the neoliberalization of the United States itself. The experimental implementation of economic orthodoxy—the deregulation of state power, financialization, or the unrestrained practice of financial and trading markets, privatization and the destruction of forms of social solidarity such as trade unions—established Chile as the first largescale neoliberal laboratory. Chile subsequently legitimized neoliberal discourse that would prove to be highly malleable in different contexts. ‘‘The Chilean case,’’ as Juan Gabriel Valde´s argues, ‘‘became a model, a unique phenomenon that did not stem from any historical experience. Rather, it originated directly from what the Chicago Boys termed ‘‘economic science’’: a science to be found mostly in their textbooks.’’68 It is the implementation and experience of neoliberal revolution that proved crucial for its normalization as a valid or ‘‘tried and true’’ theory for subsequent implementation in the United States. Under conditions of what later became known as shock treatment, Latin America during the 1970s proved to be the crucible for experimenting with the ideas put forward by the Chicago School of economic theory. In Latin America, economic regulatory mechanisms were radically and quickly transformed in favor of market-based solutions characteristic of neo-imperial reassertion.69 The Chicago School of economic theory, embodied in the writings and teachings of Milton Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in 1976, advocated the deregulation of markets and the contraction of the state as a way of promoting individual freedom and wealth.70 Following Friedrich von Hayek, Friedman and other neoconservative proponents believed that markets in general possess an internal rationality that nullifies the potential for state domination. The ideas emanating from the Chicago School of economics depoliticized economic questions by emphasizing how ‘‘markets’’ were able to address substantive political problems. Neoliberalization, Wendy Brown argues following Michel Foucault, takes for granted that ‘‘The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality . . . [and that] all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality.’’71 Neoliberalization was then much more than simply the financialization of the international and domestic economies, as Arrighi argues, but the attempt at completely rewiring the political–economic form of American liberal hegemony. The novelty of neoliberalization, as Peck argues, ‘‘denotes the repeated (necessity for) renewal and reinvention of a project that could never be fixed as a stable formula, and which has lurched through moments of innovation, overreach, correction, and crisis.’’72 This political–economic project was first concretely experimented with in Chile during its own internal crises of the 1970s.73 What was significant in this case was that the neoliberal experiment occurred in the aftermath of the American-influenced coup d’e´tat by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973. The election of the leftist Salvador Allende in 1970 was deemed by the Nixon administration to be a grave threat to American strategic and corporate interests in the Western hemisphere. National security advisor Henry Kissinger argued at a meeting of the National Security Council [NSC] that Allende’s program ‘‘would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world.’’ Chile, Kissinger continued, could ‘‘become part of a Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region.’’74 In this Cold War geopolitical context, what Valde´s calls the ‘‘ideological transfer’’ of Chicago School economic ideas through their progenitors, the Chicago Boys, was perceived transnationally by American and Chilean elites as a way of countering the legitimacy of socialist/Marxist ideas. The Chicago Boys—Chilean graduate students at the University of Chicago, whose studies were financed in part by the Ford Foundation and the State Department, and who would later become faculty members in various economics departments in Chile—embarked on the radical transformation of the Chilean economy.75 As Mario Sznajder writes, Chile had become a kind of socio-economic laboratory in which a neoliberal experiment was being carried out with scant political hinderance. In the second half of the 1970s, the military government gave priority to the economic experiment, relying on its success to legitimise the future political framework of limited democracy, which in turn would provide the required guarantee for the survival and defence of the neoliberal model.76 This radical transformation was largely justified as a reaction against everything that Salvador Allende’s socialist economic program stood for. What was characterized as La vı´a chilena al socialismo, social spending to alleviate poverty, protection of domestic industries, a moratorium of foreign debt repayment, made the Nixon administration so fearful of its turn toward the Soviet Union.77 For the purposes of ‘‘shocking’’ the economic system in order to push for dramatic changes that the Chicago boys would otherwise have been unable to accomplish, authoritarianism and economic reform occurred hand in hand. The result was that what were ostensibly political decisions, the determination of the contours of the socioeconomic order was not determined democratically, but rather by economic experts.78 The authoritarianism of the Chilean coup was characterized by the arrest of over 13,000 people deemed ‘‘Marxist subversives’’; grave abuses of human rights occurred over a prolonged period of time, including executions of political dissents.79 Nonetheless, with the economy in a shambles in the aftermath of the coup, Chile was an ideal place for experimenting with ideas that had been gestating among the Chicago Boys and their teachers for many years. First and foremost, these economists ‘‘radically altered the Chilean economic paradigm, bringing it into line not just with military self-interest in retaining control but also with the general tendencies of the world economy.’’80 ‘‘The goal [of the Chicago Boys attempt at reform],’’ as Valde´s further adds, ‘‘was nothing less than the transformation of the state, of customs, and of culture’’ but especially, as Pinochet himself remarked, to engender a complete ‘‘change in mentality.’’81 The explicit purpose of economic transformation was to tame the hyperinflation of the preceding years, but it proved to be an opportunity to implement ‘‘a radical economic liberalization program based on the indiscriminate use of market mechanisms, the dismantling and reduction of the state, deregulation of the financial sector, and a discourse that ascribed to market forces the ability to solve practically any problem in society.’’82 As a result of the privatization of finance and the lowering of tariffs and taxation, Chile became, as one New York Times journalist characterized it, ‘‘a banker’s delight.’’ According to this journalist, the Chicago Boys economically and politically cemented Chile’s position in the US imperial orbit.83 This transformation of the Chilean economy along Chicago School theories, for the purposes of aligning it, as Valde´s argues, with the world economy captured the imagination of a whole host of academic economists, journalists, and policy makers in the United States and in various international organizations: From the mid-1970s onward, the country enjoyed privileged treatment by the IMF and the commercial banks. Chile was doubtless the country most visited and commented upon by journalists from the international conservative press, as well as by a distinguished list of academics headed by the most prominent members of the Chicago School of Economics, including Milton Friedman himself. The reason for this interest is easy to comprehend: Chile had become the first and most famous example of applying the rules of economic orthodoxy to a developing country. Foreign trade was liberalized, prices were freed, state companies were privatized, the financial sector was deregulated, and state functions were drastically reduced.84 A Barron’s editorial in 1980 quoted Arnold Harberger, a professor at the time at the University of Chicago who was perhaps even more influential than Milton Friedman with the Chicago Boys, as arguing that the Chilean reforms were ‘‘the most important reforms made in the underdeveloped world in recent history.’’ As the editorial further adds quoting an anonymous colleague of Harberger’s: ‘‘The economics textbooks say that’s the way the world should work, but where else do they practice it?’’85 Implied here is that the economic programof the Chicago Boys is suitable for implementation throughout the developing world as a way of generating economic growth and efficiency.86 But there is also a certain implication for what needs to be done within the United States itself that was at the time faced with a growing crisis of stagflation. Of course, the obvious authoritarianism of the Pinochet government and its breaches of international human rights conventions was a significant source of contention and even opprobrium; Friedman himself would be tagged as complicit in legitimizing the Pinochet regime through his own trip to Chile in 1975 and his meeting with Pinochet. His awarding of the Nobel Prize in 1976 was accompanied with protests. But as Corey Robin has recently uncovered, in 1981 American academics including Friedman, Hayek, James M. Buchanan, and Arnold Harberger, along with their counterparts from many other countries, met in Vin˜a del Mar under the auspices of the Mont Pelerin Society, to demonstrate the effectiveness of Chilean market reforms and the need to learn its lessons for the United States itself. The inherent authoritarian setting in Chile should not be seen as anything detrimental to the neoliberal project. On the contrary, as Robin cites Eric Brodin’s original commentary on the Vin˜a del Mar conference, ‘‘what is politically possible in authoritarian Chile, may not be possible in a republic with a congress filled with ‘‘gypsy moths’’ for whom political expediency often takes precedence over economic realities, especially in an election year.’’87 Again, implied here is a certain perception that a reassertion of governmental authority within the United States is necessary to address domestic and international political–economic questions. The Chilean example represented a success story for a reinvigorated conservative movement in the United States and the United Kingdom during the mid- to late 1970s. In 1981, Hayek himself would speak of Chile as ‘‘a great success’’ and predicted that ‘‘The world shall come to regard the recovery of Chile as one of the great economic miracles of our time.’’88 Chile became the decisive laboratory for the establishment, more generally, of a transnational post-Fordist economic order which emphasized flexibility, innovation, and creative destruction. This new order replaced the Bretton Woods currency framework by privileging the free flow of finance capital as a way of restructuring and disciplining various internal economies. The transformation of internal economic structures by finance capital was accompanied by a general sentiment that excessive popular democracy is detrimental to economic rights and liberties and that market rationality would best determine the distribution of wealth. The neoliberalization of Chile encapsulated the hopes and agenda of American’s conservatives to privatize a significant portion of the state to market forces, to deregulate financial services and lower taxation, and above all, to suppress the power of trade unions. However, this domestic project to promote economic freedom at home and abroad was fundamentally connected to the restoration of American hegemony. The Reagan revolution in the United States largely rested on the dual program of domestic economic neoliberalization and a pseudo-Keynesian massive armaments buildup. ‘‘The effect of what seemed to be a confused economic policy was,’’ as Grandin argues, ‘‘in retrospect, a cohesive transformation of American society and diplomacy—the institutionalizing of a perpetual system of global austerity that rendered political liberalism, both domestic and international, not viable.’’89 Arrighi argues that tight monetary policies were designed to resurrect confidence in the United States and its currency. However, austerity had significant repercussions for American domestic industry and led to a significant dismantling of trade unionism, an overarching neoconservative political goal. The great recession of the early 1980s was at the same time an engineered shock treatment that was designed to roll back inflation to the detriment of state welfare, while accentuating class power. Taxation changes primarily favoredwealthy classes and financial deregulation opened up finance capital for enormous speculative bubbles over the subsequent thirty years. The effect of this program of neoliberalization conjoined with the Reagan ‘‘rollback’’ of Soviet influence depoliticized such economic ‘‘shock’’ transformations at home and abroad. The neoliberalization of the state and society in the United States and the United Kingdom represents the normalization of pervious shock treatments experimented first and foremost within the Chilean neo-imperial crucible. This normalization of radical economic theories through hegemonic international circuits such as the IMF, the World Bank, academics, journalists, various semiprivate think tanks in the West, gave rise to what Bourdieu and Wacquant have termed a neoliberal vulgate that legitimizes a depoliticized program for structural reform across not only the global South but also within the North as the only viable program to tackle the twin economic problems of growth and inflation. As opposed to Ikenberry who draws a straight line from 1945 to the present without so much as noting the significance of the crisis of American hegemony in the 1970s, these years proved pivotal for a reassertion of hegemony through domestic and international (i.e., throughout the global South) neoliberalization. This reassertion could not be accomplished by military means, as demonstrated in Vietnam; it had to come through the radical transformation of domestic socioeconomic configurations that would privilege specific classes that would realign the South within America’s neo-imperial orbit. But what also needs to be recognized is that this global American hegemonic reassertion was intimately tied to domestic (counterrevolutionary) changes beginning in the 1980s. This conjunction between the international and the domestic is more clearly seen in how ideas, norms, and practices are experimented with in certain spaces, travel across international hierarchical circuits, and return as normalized and legitimized.

China threat discourse is manufactured to extract concessions for neoliberal elites

Gulick 9

China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism

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That is, although **a menacing "China threat" discourse** may issue **from the Pentagon and** kindred **think tanks** from time to time, its **latent function may be the wresting of concessions from the CCP**—regarding enforcement of copyrights and patents, for example—such that ongoing market reforms disproportionately advantage the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and U.S. financial institutions (McGregor 2005; Weisman 2006). However, **the extension of U.S. preeminence by structurally tying China's development model to Wall Street** and the imperial **dollar works only insofar as the populist-protectionist bloc** in the United States **plays the subordinate role of useful pawn on behalf of U.S. transnational capital,** especially its financial wing (Pctras 2005). Even though lor many years the preponderant U.S. strategic stance

China threat perception is a neoliberal fantasy

Petras 5 (James Petras - Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, 9/25/05, “US-China: Free market or statism”, http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=19)

Instead of accepting the economic challenge from China and recognizing the need for re-thinking the misallocations of resources and the over-reliance on the paper economy, retrograde business elites and overpaid trade union bosses have joined forces with neo-conservative ideologues in promoting the idea of China as a national security threat which needs to be confronted militarily. The fusion of militarism abroad and protectionism at home has gained many adherents in Congress and in the executive branch ? setting the stage for a self-fulfilling prophecy. Faced with increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Washington, China looks eastward toward strengthening its military and economic ties with Russia and Central Asia while diversifying its trade with Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.

It’s a constructed self-fulfilling prophecy that displaces economic fears

Lim 12 (K. F. Lim - PhD candidate, University of British Columbia, 2012, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary”)

We live in a world replete with a motley set of security threats: some that we encounter locally on a daily basis, some more geographically removed, some purely imaginary. The situation becomes more convoluted when it comes to assessing “national” security threats, because threat identification presupposes the “nation”, as a collective group of disparate citizens, would somehow be affected by such threats. This is not easy, because addressing one “national” threat (eg state-to-state military threat) may not correspond to the needs for other forms of security (eg access to healthcare services, gainful employment etc). **Erroneous threat imaginations could generate a self-fulfilling prophecy**—the supposed “threats which never were” might actually turn real. The challenge for **accurate threat identifications grows** even **harder when** variegated doses of **capitalist realism** **permeate foreign policymaking and lead t**o the creation of transnational **geo-economic configurations involving putative geopolitical rivals.** In this paper, I have illustrated how geopolitical calculations remain significant and might be incommensurable with geo-economic conceptions of security that view integrated, cross-border spaces of/for capital accumulation as a primary precondition of political and social stability. From China's foreign policies over the past decade, it is evident that Chinese leaders prefer carving open space for economic development to armed conflicts. The development of East Asia into a dynamic and fast-growing region within the global system of capitalism is significantly contingent on the Chinese government's peace-oriented foreign and trade policies towards neighboring countries. Since its politico-economic liberalization in 1979, **China**—a distinct Cold War “enemy”, together with the now-defunct Soviet Union—**has demonstrated no ideological or military hostility** towards its regional neighbors and the US **for** the past **three decades**; tout au contraire, relations between these nation-states have strengthened after the Cold War. More significantly, China's stance towards North Korea's military provocations—notably its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship and shelling of a South Korean island in March and November 2010 respectively—have mutated from overt acceptance to tacit tolerance, which reflects its importance as a strategic partner in preventing violence (especially nuclear warfare) on the Korean peninsula. The emergence of new geo-economic formations further complicates the picture: both the US and Taiwan are involved in geo-economic configurations with China, and all three economies are experimenting with different forms of regulatory structures that frees up economic space for flows of capital, commodities and people. This corresponds with Cowen and Smith's (2009:43) observation that “[t]he rise of geoeconomics does not necessarily mean that boundaries and territories become less important, but their strict national articulation may”. On this evidence, **it might be difficult to pinpoint China as a direct “national” threa**t to the US or any other nation-state. I emphasized in the discussion that any assessment of a “threat” from China as a result of its geopolitical standoff with Taiwan needs to be critically interpreted because the US—through an ambiguous geo-legal definition of Taiwan—contributes significantly to the production of this “threat”. Furthermore, **fears within the US of China's ascendency in the global system of capitalism could be concatenated**—either explicitly or subconsciously—**to a corresponding fear of the loss of global economic competitiveness** by the US. After all, as Harvey (2003:12) reminds us, “[**t]here is indeed a long history of governments in trouble domestically seeking to solve their problems** either by foreign adventures or **by manufacturing foreign threats to consolidate solidarities at home**”.

Extinction

Roberts 7/1/12 (Paul Craig Roberts, Chairman of The Institute for Political Economy and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy under Reagan Administration, <http://thesantosrepublic.com/2012/07/can-the-world-survive-washingtons-hubris-the-obama-administration-has-russia-and-china-targeted/>)

The evidence is simply overwhelming that Washington–both parties–have Russia and China targeted. Whether the purpose is to destroy both countries or merely to render them unable to oppose Washington’s world hegemony is unclear at this time. Regardless of the purpose, nuclear war is the likely outcome. The presstitute American press pretends that an evil Syrian government is murdering innocent citizens who only want democracy and that if the UN won’t intervene militarily, the US must in order to save human rights. Russia and China are vilified by US functionaries for opposing any pretext for a NATO invasion of Syria. The facts, of course, are different from those presented by the presstitute American media and members of the US government. The Syrian “rebels” are well armed with military weapons. The “rebels” are battling the Syrian army. The rebels massacre civilians and report to their media whores in the West that the deed was done by the Syrian government, and the Western presstitutes spread the propaganda. Someone is arming the “rebels” as obviously the weapons can’t be purchased in local Syrian markets. Most intelligent people believe the weapons are coming from the US or from US surrogates. So, Washington has started a civil war in Syria, as it did in Libya, but this time the gullible Russians and Chinese have caught on and have refused to permit a UN resolution like the one the West exploited against Gaddafi. To get around this roadblock, fish out an ancient Phantom fighter jet from the 1960s Vietnam war era and have Turkey fly it into Syria. The Syrians will shoot it down, and then Turkey can appeal to its NATO allies to come to its aid against Syria. Denied the UN option, Washington can invoke its obligation under the NATO treaty, and go to war in defense of a NATO member against a demonized Syria. The neoconservative lie behind Washington’s wars of hegemony is that the US is bringing democracy to the invaded and bombed countries. To paraphrase Mao, “democracy comes out of the barrel of a gun.” However, the Arab Spring has come up short on democracy, as have Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries “liberated” by US democratic invasions. What the US is bringing is civil wars and the breakup of countries, as President Bill Clinton’s regime achieved in former Yugoslavia. The more countries can be torn into pieces and dissolved into rival factions, the more powerful is Washington. Russia’s Putin understands that Russia itself is threatened not only by Washington’s funding of the “Russian opposition,” but also by the strife among Muslims unleashed by Washington’s wars against secular Muslim states, such as Iraq and Syria. This discord spreads into Russia itself and presents Russia with problems such as Chechen terrorism. When a secular state is overthrown, the Islamist factions become free to be at one another’s throats. The internal strife renders the countries impotent. As I wrote previously, the West always prevails in the Middle East because the Islamist factions hate one another more than they hate their Western conquerers. Thus, when Washington destroys secular, non-Islamist governments as in Iraq and now targeted in Syria, the Islamists emerge and battle one another for supremacy. This suits Washington and Israel as these states cease to be coherent opponents. Russia is vulnerable, because Putin is demonized by Washington and the US media and because Putin’s Russian opposition is financed by Washington and serves US, not Russian, interests. The turmoil that Washington is unleashing in Muslim states leaks back to Russia’s Muslim populations. It has proved to be more difficult for Washington to interfere in China’s internal affairs, although discord has been sowed in some provinces. Several years from now, the Chinese economy is expected to exceed in size the US economy, with an Asian power displacing a Western one as the world’s most powerful economy. Washington is deeply disturbed by this prospect. In the thrall and under the control of Wall Street and other special interest business groups, Washington is unable to rescue the US economy from its decline. The short-run gambling profits of Wall Street, the war profits of the military/security complex, and the profits from offshoring the production of goods and services for US markets have far more representation in Washington than the wellbeing of US citizens. As the US economy sinks, the Chinese economy rises. Washington’s response is to militarize the Pacific. The US Secretary of State has declared the South China Sea to be an area of American national interest. The US is wooing the Philippine government, playing the China threat card, and working on getting the US Navy invited back to its former base at Subic Bay. Recently there were joint US/Philippines military/naval exercises against the “China threat.” The US Navy is reallocating fleets to the Pacific Ocean and constructing a new naval base on a South Korean island. US Marines are now based in Australia and are being reallocated from Japan to other Asian countries. The Chinese are not stupid. They understand that Washington is attempting to corral China. For a country incapable of occupying Iraq after 8 years and incapable of occupying Afghanistan after 11 years, to simultaneously take on two nuclear powers is an act of insanity. The hubris in Washington, fed daily by the crazed neocons, despite extraordinary failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, has now targeted formidable powers–Russia and China. The world has never in its entire history witnessed such idiocy. The psychopaths, sociopaths, and morons who prevail in Washington are leading the world to destruction. The criminally insane government in Washington, regardless whether Democrat or Republican, regardless of the outcome of the next election, is the greatest threat to life on earth that has ever existed.

The presumption of exclusive non-state terror that can be objectively studied is suspect – it’s a self-fulfilling construction constructed through speech and accumulation of data

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As explained earlier, a ﬁrst order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientiﬁc modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead sufﬁce to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives. In the ﬁrst instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial deﬁnition within the ﬁeld and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002). The assumption that terrorism can be objectively deﬁned and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identiﬁed in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the ﬁrst instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identiﬁable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security ofﬁcials, and the codiﬁcation of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement ofﬁcials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the deﬁnitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies ﬁeld. Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004). More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, speciﬁcally, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key ﬁndings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s ﬁndings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005). Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efﬁcacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006). In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the ﬁeld, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the ﬁrst order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and ﬁnal ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, ﬁrst order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the ﬁeld, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

**No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant**

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that **none exist**. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

the affirmative’s hegemony impact is reminiscent of the algonquian monster, the wendigo – insatiable and bloodthirsty, its only purpose is endless destruction as it struggles to maintain itself – in a similar way, hegemony is a constant process of enemy-creation – a paranoid politics towards the impossible telos of world domination – this politics is responsible both for every atrocity in the 20th century as well as the exacerbation of every modern geopolitical crisis

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-11-13, “US Creates Nuclear Armed Cyber-attack Retaliation Force. Psychotic Superpower on a Hair Trigger,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/11/us-creates-nuclear-armed-cyberattack-retaliation-force-psychotic-superpower-on-a-hair-trigger/>) gz

Since at least World War II, the genocidal propensity and practices of the US are proven, if not widely known, especially among its propagandized public. The atomic holocaust of hundreds of thousands of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the long shadow cast upon the world by this deranged superpower. For a few decades, the crazed American giant could hide behind the veil of the «Cold War» against the Soviet Union, pretending to be the protector of the «free world». If that was true, then why since the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago has there not been peace on earth? Why have conflicts proliferated to the point that there is now a permanent state of war in the world? Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan have melded into countless other US-led wars across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The «War on Terror» and its tacit invocation of «evil Islamists» have sought to replace the «Cold War» and its bogeymen, the «evil communists». But if we set aside these narratives, then the alternative makes compelling sense and accurate explanation of events. That alternative is simply this: that the US is an imperialist warmonger whose appetite for war, plunder and hegemony is insatiable. If the US had no official enemy, it would have to invent one. The Cold War narrative can be disabused easily by the simple contradictory fact, as already mentioned, that more than 22 years after the collapse of the «evil» Soviet Union the world is no less peaceful and perhaps even more racked by belligerence and conflict. The War on Terror narrative can likewise be dismissed by the fact that the «evil Islamists» supposedly being combated were created by US and British military intelligence along with Saudi money in Afghanistan during the 1980s and are currently being supported by the West to destabilize Libya and Syria and indirectly Mali. So what we are left to deduce is a world that is continually being set at war by the US and its various surrogates. As the executive power in the global capitalist system, the US is the main protagonist in pursuing the objectives of the financial-military-industrial complex. These objectives include: subjugation of all nations – their workers, governments and industries, for the total economic and political domination by the global network of finance capitalism. In this function, of course, the US government is aided by its Western allies and the NATO military apparatus. Any nation not completely toeing the imperialist line will be targeted for attack. They include Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. In the past, they included Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama. Presently, others include Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Mali undergoing attack operations. The difference between covert and overt attack by the US hegemon is only a matter of degrees. The decades-long economic sanctions on Iran, the cyber sabotage of that country’s industries and infrastructure, the assassination of nuclear scientists, deployment of terrorist proxies such as the MEK, and the repeated threat of all-out war by the US and its Israeli surrogate, could all qualify Iran as already being subjected to war and not just a future target. Likewise with Russia: the expansion of US missile systems around Russia’s borders is an act of incremental war. Likewise China: the American arming of Taiwan, relentless war gaming in the South China Sea and the stoking of territorial conflicts are all examples of where «politics is but war by other means». What history shows us is that the modern world has been turned into a lawless shooting gallery under the unhinged misrule of the United States of America. That has always been so since at least the Second World War, with more than 60 wars having been waged by Washington during that period, and countless millions killed. For decades this truth has been obscured by propaganda – the Cold War, War on Terror etc – but now the appalling stark reality is unavoidably clear. The US is at war – against the entire world.

This politics is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13**.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

## 2NC

### 2NC FW

Representations and the affective field of images are the basis and motivation for war. What we lack is not a proper scientific or empirical challenge to violence; we lack the cultural critics willing to fight the fear mongering which results in war. The AFF’s discourse is enmeshed in a form of affective securitization that makes war inevitable. As scholars, we have an obligation to refuse and problematize the cultural grammar of security.

Elliott 2012

/Emory, University Professor of the University of California and Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open Humanities Press, Online/

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II: In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere. In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruction, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demonstrations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relationships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable discussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward polarized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist religious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.

Affect determines politics – Affective networks are an inevitable part of existence, these networks organize and interpret reality – it is not possible to simply wish away emotion in politics

**Fernández, 2000**

(Damián J., Head of the Ethical Culture Fieldston School and PhD in International Relations @ University of Miami, *Cuba and the Politics of Passion*, University of Texas Press, Pg. vi-xv)

Affection and passion, their norms and their networks, do not disappear in modern societies, or in those such as Cuba that, according to some, are not modern enough. The affective is an integral part of the human, the cultural and the social, expressed differently—that is, with particular norms, roles, and modalities—in specific contexts and with multiple paradoxical consequences for political order. The emotional is not prepolitical but merely political. The modern account of politics is partial in that it dismisses competing and coexisting epistemologies and ontologies. The Cuban experience shows that divergent political cultural paradigms coexist, shaping the course of a society in unexpected and unforetold ways. The resilience of alternative and ‘‘traditional’’ ways of relating to the social world is an integral part of this story. What is modern and what is not become hazy, as modern notions—such as revolution—are propelled by nonmodern forces such as religious zeal and affective bonds. In some ways this book also tells the story of the author, as most books do. Contrary to currently fashionable claims that the author is dead, he or she never is, even if the ‘‘I’’ does not appear at the beginning of sentences and despite an inevitable degree of intertextuality. This story is part of my own story as I deal with issues of reason and emotion, of desire and disenchantment, of modernity and antimodernity, of civility and incivility, of nationalism and internationalism, and of exceptionalism and universalism. The Anglo-Saxon message, transmitted to me on more than one occasion—not to be emotional or judgmental, and not to take things personally—always struck me as a bit absurd, if not outright dehumanizing. Now I understand that to be or not to be emotional is an expression of culture. To express your emotions is also to make judgments on reality and to interpret that reality personally (the only way I know how). Now I know that modern socialization is in no small measure an attempt to render individuals unemotional (capitalism and its political order seemingly require it), impersonal (by allegedly divorcing the private from the public), and nonjudgmental. This doctrine of the good modern subject, detrimental as it is to a holistic interpretation of human action (not to mention its noxious message on how to live life), has insidiously influenced the way we study and approach our field. This book is my way of responding to and challenging that epistemology and ontology. After a brief review of why passion (almost) disappeared from political science, Chapter 1 offers a reinterpretation of the role of the affective in politics. It argues that emotion and reason should be understood as supplemental rather than oppositional categories of human behavior; emotions have their reasons and their interests. Only by incorporating the emotional can we get a fuller picture of the ‘‘reasons’’ people act the way they do. Most modern approaches to politics assume or presume an emotional infrastructure that is never explicitly explained but which is decisive in constructing, maintaining, and destroying political order, as the Cuban case shows.

**Ceding imagination to the state effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – choose to confront your role in violence**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### AT: Perm

**The permutation is a teleological knee jerk which blocks out critique**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### Link

**cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

### AT: Kratochwil

short term framing causes reactionary violence and serial policy failure – reflection is a prerequisite – this is also an impact turn to weighing the aff

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Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention frompractitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

## 1NR

### Alt Causes

Here’s another 1ac author with even more alt causes all specific to Latin America

Grandin 10 – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” *New Labor Forum*, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

-Lack of US opening its market to Brazil

-Lack of yielding on the FTA of the Americas

-Military operations in Columbia

Here’s what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede to longstanding Brazilian demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to Brazilian com- modities, especially soy and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol. It would yield on other issues that have stalled the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those infected with the HIV virus. Such concessions would provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be meaningless without Brazil, South America’s largest and most dynamic economy. ¶ The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombia—including recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—who is entering the last year of his second and last term—has become the spokesperson for the collective discontent, an indication of his country’s regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-to-be post-Lula Brazil might find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and toward the United States. Washington would also drop the five-decade-old trade embargo on Cuba, thus burying a Cold War relic that continues to tarnish the U.S. image. Normalizing relations with Cuba would create an additional enticement for Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest in Cuba and is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market. Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even as it set up a de facto arrangement with Brazil to administer the region. This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, it would mean leashing the quasi-privatized “democracy promotion” organizations—largely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run by the International Republican Institute—that have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admitted—they fund oppositional “civil soci- ety” groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to menace Left govern- ments throughout the region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2 Similar destabilization efforts tried to topple Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards. It would be easy for the Obama administration to rein these groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable. Washington would also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed “War on Drugs,” as Latin America’s leading intellectuals and policymakers—including many former presidents—are demanding; in the last few months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and heroin.

### Barder

#### Written out of the 1AC empirical analysis hegemony is the failure of the War in Vietnam and the subsequent construction of neoliberal laboratories across the global south beginning with Chile. The AFF imagines U.S. hegemony existing in the vacuum of international anarchy; the history told by the 1AC is a Eurocentric history which obfuscates the U.S.’s role in propping up brutal dictatorships to reassert its hegemonic control. Hegemony is intimately bound the brutal spread of neoliberalism.

**Barder 2013**

/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, “American Hegemony Comes Home: The Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/

Examining historical patterns of international hierarchy reveals a rich and multidirectional diffusion of norms, practices, and knowledges between dominant and subordinate polities.2 Imperial historians have for some time now have documented this transnational norm diffusion by looking more closely at how colonial spaces were in fact laboratories of sociopolitical experimentation.3 Nonetheless, this multidirectional norm diffusion and appreciation of the active reverberations from imperial or subordinate spaces remains largely unexplored by international theorists, for two main reasons. First, the fact that canonical international theory remains largely predicated upon an assumption of international anarchy which is construed as a timeless feature of international politics.4 This assumption implies a representation of the state ahistorically.5 Furthermore, it construes the global South as a largely passive and peripheral actor in world history. Second, because of a continuing Eurocentrism that conceptualizes the ‘‘West’’ as a privileged historical actor by taking for granted that Western norms travel outbound rather than being the product of interactions with ‘‘non-Western’’ polities.6 Socialization, when it is theorized in international theory, is typically conceived as the socialization of the non-West into an already constituted European society of states.7 What these two perspectives imply is a lack of appreciation within international theory of how historical patterns of hierarchical international relations have resulted in a set of what some have called a colonial archive that has left significant imprints upon the historical trajectory of Western state-formation.8 Taking the above into consideration, this article explores the conjunction between changes in American hegemony over the course of the 1970s and the subsequent neoliberalization of the United States in the early 1980s. While the story of the emergence of neoliberalism has been told through many different angles, I argue that this ‘‘Reagan-Thatcher neoliberal counterrevolution’’ represents the normalization of a set of economic theories that were initially experimented within Chile during the mid- to late 1970s and later adapted within the United States and the United Kingdom.9 Beginning in the late 1960s with the American defeat in the Vietnam War, and later, the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the spike in oil prices and especially the economic crises of stagflation throughout the industrialized North, American political and economic supremacy was radically challenged. However, as Giovanni Arrighi has shown, this neoliberal counterrevolution was not simply a response to a particular economic crisis condition; it was more importantly a political reassertion of American global hegemony by the means of economic structural adjustment. Moreover, this project of restoring American supremacy abroad was fundamentally entwined with a domestic reassertion of governmental authority. As Greg Grandin succinctly puts it, ‘‘the restoration of American’s global military power and the restoration of laissez-faire capitalism were increasingly understood to be indistinguishable goals.’’10 What connects the international dimension of crisis management and hegemonic reassertion with domestic neoliberalization is precisely the manner in which the operationalization of neoliberal reform was experimented with and innovated in various informal American laboratories. The Chilean laboratory in particular permitted, under authoritarian conditions, the radical transformation of the economy according to principles and theories laid out by the Chicago School of economics. This experience would then become perceived as the ‘‘tried-and-true’’ developmental model not only across the global South, but also, with varying degrees, across the North. This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I depart from G. John Ikenberry’s recent discussion on post–Second World War American liberal hegemony. While Ikenberry importantly draws our attention to the hierarchical components of this apre`s guerre international order and its processes of norm diffusion, he crucially misses the profound crisis of American hegemony of the 1970s. In the second section, I turn to both Robert Brenner and Giovanni Arrighi to show, first, the importance of both intercapitalist competition (Brenner) and the collapse of American international political legitimacy in the wake of the Vietnam War (Arrighi) to account for the erosion of American control over the global South. Finally, in the third section, I turn to the specific case of Chile and show how it becomes an important laboratory setting for the experimentation and development of neoliberalism. This sociopolitical/economic innovation proved to imbricate both a project of reasserting American hegemony abroad and governmental authority at home.

They conceded an independent economic rationality warrant in the Barder evidence – Their impacts rely on the concept of the homo calculan – this creates a sadistic necro-economy that makes their impacts inevitable and turns us into slaves

Bifo 11 (Franco Berardi is an is Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism, After the Future , 09/20/11, <http://www.sok.bz/web/media/video/AfterFuture.pdf>, [JJ])

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality.¶ Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the¶ problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went¶ wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the¶ Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economists¶ the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned,¶ because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market.¶ And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic¶ theology of neoliberalism.¶ But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is¶ an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed¶ to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and¶ perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social¶ action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the¶ conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an¶ attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault¶ (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The¶ Birth of Biopolitics.¶ This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced¶ cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon¶ flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not¶ perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective¶ reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal¶ spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we¶ confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof¶ and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s¶ assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof¶ and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is¶ not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic¶ episteme.¶ Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008).¶ Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much¶ deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous¶ publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it¶ subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli¶ 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers¶ experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their¶ everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15).¶ Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social¶ production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the¶ prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living¶ energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of¶ financial craziness, but also the effect of the de-vitalization of the social field.¶ This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of¶ economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two¶ centuries.¶ Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis¶ of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the¶ psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire¶ and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that¶ the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. ¶ Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word¶ “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and¶ description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist.¶ The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that¶ exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.¶ Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic¶ discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls¶ under the domination of capitalist rule.¶ The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic¶ description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a¶ technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a¶ narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: ¶ Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and¶ perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything¶ within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the¶ Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows¶ itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value,¶ bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity,¶ demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to¶ behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do¶ tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold¶ the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of¶ psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks,¶ investments and losses. (Sordello 1983)¶ From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a¶ process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were¶ intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people¶ who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to¶ become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on¶ the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique¶ of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human¶ beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented¶ activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time¶ itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and¶ body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth¶ is making scarce both water and air.¶ Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of¶ producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx¶ did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of¶ economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies¶ richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to¶ the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried¶ work. ¶ In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very¶ foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of¶ material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the¶ Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic¶ categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. ¶ The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of¶ John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be¶ privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple.¶ But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without¶ cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process,¶ the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and¶ it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary,¶ the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product,¶ is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it¶ almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time¶ and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able¶ to determine price and salary.¶ The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide¶ deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational¶ expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a¶ lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global¶ capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund¶ and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of¶ the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the¶ market is militarily regulated.¶ The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect¶ knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect¶ rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has¶ finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The¶ theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic¶ agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best¶ deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies¶ has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the¶ theoretical swindle. ¶ Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational¶ factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading¶ information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional¶ tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. ¶ The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has¶ the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural¶ law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in¶ control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power¶ has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to¶ recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times¶ on September 6th 2009:¶ After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks¶ began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may¶ have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance¶ policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life¶ expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies,¶ in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds.¶ They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will¶ receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the¶ policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than¶ expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money.¶ Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would¶ absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay¶ the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I¶ 113die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the¶ insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t¶ need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story:¶ financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. ¶ The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It’s not¶ new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides.¶ But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the¶ investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure.¶ The logic of speculation is different from the logic of spectacle that was¶ dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle is the mirrorization of life, the¶ transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation. Speculation is the¶ subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of present life¶ with future money that will never come, because death will come before.¶ The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad:¶ neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their¶ speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political¶ class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to¶ protect society from the final assault.¶ In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when¶ the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”.¶ Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of¶ the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of¶ political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The¶ economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists¶ have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of¶ growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles¶ have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

### Heg

Utilitarian problem solving justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

The affirmative’s hegemonic politics is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13**.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.